Hume’s aesthetics applied to classical music: Who decides when emotion is too much emotion - what does too much emotion mean? Part One
I’ve been inspired by Steven
Isserlis’s interesting and thought provoking Facebook post1 to start
writing about Hume and music because Isserlis raises key notions which, I think,
Hume could shed light on in order to help us untangle the complex concepts we
often use in the music world. I would like to do something a little different
from Isserlis by philosophically analysing the deeper implications of the terms
we use casually.
In summary, I understand Isserlis
as arguing against “the danger of pouring superfluous beauty” into music,
conveying “false emotion” in the way a musician goes about playing a piece. He
advocates “judicious” “choices” about how we play a piece to transmit the
meaning and truth of the music. He concludes that we must “ensure we are
telling the right story” through the music and warns that “it is all too easy
to inflame an audience through false passions; but if we do that, we are
distorting the truth. And reaching the truth of the music has to be our
ultimate aim.”2
Setting aside Isserlis’s post,
the concepts within it made me wonder how Hume would analyse such statements.
Here, the concept I shall focus on is whether, according to Hume, it is
technically speaking more philosophically accurate to talk about false or
inappropriate emotions or passions or whether what we are really referring to
is an assumption or judgement which we wish to deem judicious or injudicious.
In his ‘A Treatise of Human
Nature’3, Hume specifies that, strictly speaking, an emotion cannot
be inappropriate or unreasonable. This is because only ideas can disagree,
contradict, or oppose a truth, but emotion cannot4. This is due to
the fact that passions are part of how we are as human beings, we just have
emotional feelings and reactions5. However, ideas represent objects
in the world. So they function differently from emotions which do not represent
objects out in the world but instead are within us6. So, Hume thinks
that passions and emotions can never “be contradictory to truth and reason;
since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas”7.
This means that passion and reason cannot be in direct conflict with one
another and that, as Hume famously states:
“Reason is and ought only to be
the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to
serve and obey them.”8
We react to objects through our
passions and emotions and this impacts on us and influences our impulses and actions9.
The role of reason is to engage our reasoning faculties to figure out
connections between things and how things relate to one another, for instance,
by trying to understand causes and effects10. Our “impulse” will
therefore come from our passions and emotions which will thereby influence our
actions and volitions11. Such impulses can only be opposed by
another impulse, also arising from the passions, but cannot be opposed by
reason or anything arising from it12.
Hence, the only way Hume thinks
passion and reason could clash is if the passions “are accompany’d with some
judgement or opinion” which introduces an error13. For Hume, this
means that:
“Where a passion is neither
founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the
understanding can neither justify nor condemn it.”14
Therefore, apart from these
conditions:
“…a passion can never, in any
sense, be call’d unreasonable…”15
Hume summarises his point thus:
“In short, a passion must be
accompany’d with some false judgement, in order to its being unreasonable; and
even then ‘tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but
the judgement.”16
In other words, there’s no such
thing as inappropriate emotion. When we commonly say things like this, strictly
speaking, we are referring to a supposition or judgement which we want to claim
is inaccurate, not the emotions surrounding it. So emotions and passions are
merely natural states we possess as human beings and they play a vital and
positive part in motivating our wants, desires, volitions, character and wish
to be ethical human beings, given that abstract reasoning cannot motivate
people to act. Our faculty of reason helps us make logical connections and
think through ideas in our minds and reach rational judgements. However, how
does what Hume writes on emotion and the passions apply to aesthetics? This will
be the topic of my next two blog posts.
1
Isserlis, S., (23rd September 2017 at 3:24pm) ‘Beware of emotion – well, of
inappropriate emotion, anyway… (again)’ facebook post
2
ibid
3
Hume,
D., A Treatise of Human Nature, (ed)
Selby-Bigge, Nidditch, (1978) Oxford Clarendon Press, 2nd edition
4
ibid
‘Of the influencing motives of the will’, T.II.III.III p415
5
ibid
6
ibid
7 ibid
8
ibid
9 ibid
p414
10 ibid
11
ibid
12 ibid
p415
13 ibid p416
14 ibid
15 ibid
16 ibid
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