My dissertation: 'A Feminist History of Philosophy Approach to Sympathy and the Concept of Empathy in Hume: On the Possibility of an Empathy-Based Moral Theory'

I've decided to publish my dissertation on here because one, it's relevant to this blog since it's on Hume, and two, it's for ease of reference when discussing Hume, history of philosophy, empathy, feminist ethics, and ethics, as well as when I refer to it on my blog on Empathy, available via my Blogger user profile or here.

BA Philosophy (London uni 4yr p/t) Dissertation (finals 2013)

'A Feminist History of Philosophy Approach to Sympathy and the Concept of Empathy in Hume: On the Possibility of an Empathy-Based Moral Theory'

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Degree Title: BA Philosophy, Module & Assessment name: Dissertation BA Philosophy,

submitted by 20/05/13 deadline

Total number of words 7,497

Subject area: History of Philosophy, Ethics

Title: A Feminist History of Philosophy Approach to Sympathy and the Concept of Empathy in Hume: On the Possibility of an Empathy-Based Moral Theory

Acknowledgement: I should like to thank my supervisor Professor Anthony Price for reading and commenting on both drafts and for two supervisions and a consultation all of which I’ve built on.

Abstract.

In contemporary philosophy, the distinction between sympathy and empathy is a contentious one and often blurred in theories of morality (Agosta 2011). I try to flesh out the differences between the two since research “work is needed to make them more precise” (Agosta 2011 p1). So, I attempt to refine the distinction by making the differences between sympathy and empathy stronger and put forward the suggestion that throughout Hume’s writings on sympathy he is, strictly speaking, referring to what we now term empathy rather than sympathy and would have used that term rather than sympathy had it been in usage in his era. Consequently, I try to re-evaluate Hume on sympathy and suggest Hume argued for an empathy-based moral theory. This hopefully informs feminist debate on Hume and feminist approaches to moral theory which I shall be drawing upon and attempting to further.

Title page, acknowledgement, abstract and contents: page 1

Introduction: page 2
Hume’s definition of sympathy and its antonym antipathy: page 2
Concept of and a feminist approach to empathy promoting sociability in Hume: page 4
Feminist discussion of pro-social empathy and individuality in Hume’s Treatise: page 6
Comparison as a block to sympathy and pro-social empathy: page 8
Avoidance of imperfect sympathy & criticism of giving rise to disdainful pity: page 10
Feminist analysis of having a sympathy and empathy based moral account: page 10
Conclusion: page 12

References: page 14

1

Introduction.

Sympathy is often taken to mean the psychological process whereby person A picks up on the distress or plight of person B and feels for person B in a way which leads person A to be motivated to aid person B in an active way which benefits society (Agosta 2011). Empathy, in contrast, is defined as a feeling with another person’s emotions in a way that gives the empathiser knowledge of another person’s positive and negative emotions but, unlike sympathy, it does not move the person to act on it (Agosta 2011). Thus, empathy is not seen as being as conducive to moral action as sympathy (Agosta 2011). This is because the standard definition of sympathy means that it gives rise to compassion and pity and, therefore, can be used in moral judgement since it leads to moral approbation or disapprobation (Agosta 2011). In contrast, empathy is generally seen as a “neutral form of data gathering” which may or may not lead to moral behaviour (Agosta 2011 p1).

However, I question whether this intuition in the last statement is true. My intuition is that empathy does lead to pro-social behaviour. Hence, I think that empathy is conducive to moral action and promotes both collective knowledge and social bonds within society making it viable as a basis for a moral theory (T III.III.VI; SBN 1978, Hirschmann 2000). I support this by firstly, mentioning pertinent passages in Hume’s writings, secondly, examining in detail recent feminist approaches to sympathy and the concept of empathy in relation to Hume that further both our understanding of him and feminist moral theory and thirdly, providing further support for my intuition and stance from Hume’s contemporary, the eighteenth century feminist philosopher de Grouchy (1798), who was working within the same philosophical tradition as Hume and attempting to define sympathy and use the concept of empathy as a basis for moral theory. Her account, in my opinion, sheds light on a weakness in Hume’s account of sympathy in morality and also outlines how that weakness could be avoided. I suggest Hume’s account could be refined in accordance with de Grouchy’s (1798) approach. In this way, her views add an eighteenth century perspective on a feminist approach to sympathy and the concept of empathy in moral theory as well as strengthening my proposition that Hume may well have been thinking along the same lines as her in offering a concept of empathy-based moral theory.

2

Hume’s definition of sympathy and its antonym antipathy.

Hume’s main definition of sympathy is “the conversion of an idea into an impression by the force of imagination” (T II.III.VI; SBN 1978 P427, Agosta 2011 p3). This means that, whereas the understanding usually works from an impression of sensation to an idea, in the case of sympathy, the understanding works from “the other direction”, so that, an idea turns into an impression, in this case, an impression of reflection (T II.I.XI SBN 1978 p371, T II.IIIVI SBN 1978 p427, Agosta 2011 p3). My example of this is when person A experiences joy and person B feels that joy through sympathising with person A which gives person B a grasp of how person A feels by entering into their feeling of joy and thereby feeling and experiencing the emotion with person A (T. II.I. XI; SBN 1978, Agosta 2011). This definition Hume provides of sympathy, I shall suggest later, suits how we now define empathy better than sympathy and Hume may well have written empathy instead had the term been available to him in his era.

Returning to how Hume goes about defining sympathy, it is interesting to note that he never contrasts sympathy with its antonym, antipathy, in order to clarify what he thinks is not an aspect of sympathy so we have a grasp of what sympathy excludes as well as what it includes (Baier 1991). While this may be true of Hume’s “A Treatise of Human Nature”, as Baier (1991) points out, I think I have found passages where we gain some insight into Hume’s definition of antipathy which I find illuminating to how he defines sympathy. In Hume’s “Of Parties in General” (InterLex Past Masters 2000, p2, cited as being para. 6/15 mp. 57 gp. 128 in original text), he describes a situation where people’s loyalties are split between two factions and the hostile environment produces reactions of both “general sympathy and antipathy”. A further example of Hume’s understanding of antipathy is when he lists “no sympathy with his fellow creatures” alongside twisted minds, cold-heartedness, a poor disposition, taking no pleasure in “virtue and humanity” and no esteem (The Sceptic, InterLex Past Masters 2000, p5, cited as being para. 29/55 mp. 169 gp. 222 in original text). I suggest the importance of Hume linking a lack of sympathy with not taking pleasure in humanity is that it provides textual evidence that Hume considers a concern for humanity to be an aspect of the definition of sympathy. Sympathy bonds moral people in a way that results in communities gathering and uniting and so is different from and has wider application than personal sympathy (Agosta 2011). So, I think it follows that if not taking pleasure in humanity shows a lack of sympathy then a concern for humanity and society must, by definition, be an aspect of the concept of sympathy. Equally, I suggest that not all sympathy defines as personal sympathy. My view here is supported by Lloyd (2000 p46) when she discusses “remote sympathy” as a type of sympathy. Remote sympathy involves greater use of the imagination because what one is sympathising with is more general in that it does not involve a particular individual but rather society and humanity (Lloyd 2000). The motivation behind remote sympathy may derive from the import the issue in question has for society rather than any vicarious feelings of empathic involvement with another (Lloyd 2000). This is because sympathy does not have to limit itself to personal involvement but includes remote sympathy for humanity in general, for example, when people show concern for humanitarian issues rather than only being able to focus on particular individuals or something of concern to themselves (Lloyd 2000). I find Lloyd’s discussion in line with Hume’s conclusions to his Treatise when he advocates “sympathy with mankind” (T. III.III.VI; SBN 1978 p619).

Hume unpacks this definition of sympathy in four different ways (Agosta 2011). The understanding Hume provides of sympathy that I find the least plausible is when he seems to be likening sympathy to the power of suggestion (Agosta 2011). This definition is unsatisfactory for Hume’s moral theory and this is not an aspect of sympathy Hume discusses in his Treatise but rather in his Enquiry although even here Hume does not dwell or build on it (Enquiry SBN 1975, Agosta 2011). I think that the power of suggestion is an inadequate definition of sympathy since it is not a process by which one would either reliably reach moral decisions or agree on vices, virtues and what constitutes a virtuous character. A second definition Hume offers is emotional contagion which is the phenomenon of communicating emotion in general or en masse without the emotion originating from one particular person (Agosta 2011). This I find a worrying aspect of the concept of sympathy and empathy. I would argue that emotional contagion should be kept distinct from sympathy and empathy and defined in a way that is closer to mass hysteria and certainly not incorporated into a theory of morality. Mass hysteria would merely be the violent passions taking over in such a way that it would not allow any room for reflection and, hence, morality cannot be a product of such a process. Furthermore, I suggest emotional contagion does not involve the whole mind in a way that is in keeping with Baier’s feminist approach to Hume (Lloyd 2000). Lloyd (2000) argues that in order to reach moral knowledge one should have a balance of the intellect, the calm passions and the imagination. Hence, I think emotional contagion is inadequate for attaining moral knowledge since it does not involve any of those three. A third way Hume defines sympathy is to associate it with benevolence (Agosta 2011). However, he does not at the beginning, wish to link sympathy with benevolence or indeed other emotions such as pity and compassion (Agosta 2011). Nonetheless, Hume does make a greater link between sympathy and benevolence in the Enquiry claiming that benevolence is “really beneficial to society” and is “attended with a more lively sympathy” (T.III.III.I; SBN 1978 p585, Agosta 2011 p3) However, at the outset, he relies more on a fourth definition of sympathy, the communicability of emotion (Agosta 2011). In this way, this communicability of emotion is superseded at this point in Hume’s moral philosophy by the introduction of benevolence (Agosta 2011). Nevertheless, I think that this combination of the intellect and communication of emotion develops into a notion that may now be defined as empathy.

3

Concept of and a feminist approach to empathy promoting sociability in Hume.

The distinction conflation between sympathy and empathy is partly due to the word “empathy” not entering English usage until 1909 when Tichner translated the German word einfuhlung (Agosta 2011 p1). His translation tried to capture the vicarious sense of empathy and the way one enters another person’s emotional state and feeling (Agosta 2011). Before then, only the word sympathy was in usage so there was no distinction between sympathy and empathy (Agosta 2011). Hence, sympathy had a broader meaning in Hume’s era encompassing both sympathy and empathy within the word sympathy (Agosta 2011). Similarly, de Grouchy (1798), writing decades after Hume, outlined a definition of sympathy that may now qualify as empathy in much the same way as Hume. She argued that sympathy derives from the ability to enter the feelings of another and feel their pain with them (Grouchy 1798). This gives one a “sensitivity to suffering” which creates a caring attitude towards the sufferer and is the starting point for a theory of “morality” (de Grouchy 1798 p6). Sophie de Grouchy (1798) likens this sensation of pain felt vicariously by witnessing the suffering of another to recalling the memory of a past pain one has experienced oneself. This analogy is at the heart of de Grouchy’s definition of sympathy as “the disposition we have to feel as others do” (de Grouchy 1798 p6). Again, like Hume, her eighteenth century views were expressed before the word empathy existed so, I suggest, her arguments for sympathy together with her amendments to enlightenment thought and empiricism could also be re-evaluated in terms of the relatively recent concept of empathy. I would suggest that de Grouchy (1798) is indeed referring to what one now terms empathy when she advocates sympathy in her letters. This is because she defines sympathy as a feeling “as others do” which is in line with the notion of feeling with another rather than a feeling for another (de Grouchy 1798 p6).

The concept of empathy appears during Hume’s writings about sympathy most clearly in accordance with the definition of empathy in line with Tichner’s translation of einfuhlung when Hume writes “..the principle of sympathy, by which we enter into the sentiments of the rich and the poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness” (T.II.II.V; SBN 1978 p362, Wright 2009 p208). In these passages, the concept of empathy forms a part of Hume’s arguments for the sociability of people in society which bears out as an important underpinning to human nature in his conclusion to the Treatise III.III.VI (SBN 1978). Furthermore, I would argue that what would now be termed empathy is the “animating principle” of all human emotions and so vital to any moral society (T. II.II.V; SBN 1978 p363). I maintain that this passage of the Treatise shows that empathy can be used as a basis for moral theory because Hume is using the concept of empathy while outlining the underpinnings necessary for the best grounded moral theory. The reason why I think the concept of empathy continues into this passage after he refers to one’s ability to “enter into the sentiments” of another person is that he is still referring to both positive and negative emotions (T.II.II.V; SBN 1978 p362). This can be seen by him describing various emotions ranging from “revenge” and “avarice” to “pride” and “ambition” (T. II.II.V; SBN 1978 p363). In addition, I think it is plausible for the concept of empathy to be prominent in Hume’s texts despite them being written prior to the term empathy because I think this is also true of other eighteenth century philosophers, notably de Grouchy (1798). Although she focuses on negative emotions, implicit in her approach is the involvement of positive emotions too, such as pleasure (de Grouchy 1798). Hence, I think there is scope to argue that Hume-style empirical arguments for a moral theory that centres on the concept of empathy persisted throughout the eighteenth century given that de Grouchy (1798 p6) discusses feeling “with another”. Moreover, I think de Grouchy provides an insight as to how a philosopher of Hume’s era would provide a feminist approach to a sympathy-based morality that uses the concept of empathy. The main difference in the eighteenth century between Hume and a feminist approach, I suggest, would be to highlight the empirical importance of impressions of sensation more than impressions of reflection, in order to emphasise the role of experience. The importance of the role of experience in feminism is still crucial to modern feminist ethics which gives de Grouchy (1798) contemporary relevance (Hirschmann 2000). The significance of a feminist approach to sympathy and the concept of empathy having a comprehensive empirical approach throughout a moral account is that it supports a feminist equality-based approach to morality (de Grouchy 1798). Hence, de Grouchy (1798, Letters on Sympathy xxivxxiv) argued for a purely empirical starting point to moral theory and aligned herself with the refutation of innate ideas to support the view that everyone begins life as equals in society and that moral progress in society is possible.

Furthermore, the textual evidence that Hume is not restricting himself to only the concept of sympathy is that he continues by citing the importance of being well esteemed and being able to “share” one’s “happiness” with another (T. II.II.V; SBN 1978 p363). So, by the generally accepted definitions of sympathy and empathy, Hume has continued to involve the concept of empathy in these passages. I think this shows that empathy is more than merely a “neutral form of data gathering” (Agosta 2011 p1) since Hume is describing empathy as vital to the functioning of society (T II.II.V; SBN 1978). Hume also refers to this section in the passage after it as “a general view of human nature” (T.II.II.V; SBN 1978 p363). Moreover, a criticism of this could be that uses of sympathy and or empathy are merely advocating contagion of emotion which is an inadequate basis for a theory of morality (Agosta 2011). Nevertheless, I suggest this criticism is inapplicable in this case. This is because contagion of emotion, as stated above, does not originate in a particular person whereas what Hume is describing in this passage is the human being’s need to “communicate” his “sentiments” “with” “at least” “one” other individual “with whom” he may be friends (T.II.II.V; SBN 1978 p363). Hume reinforces this by stating that passions have no impetus as concepts isolated away from the principle of sympathy (T.II.II.V; SBN 1978 p363).

4

Feminist discussion of pro-social empathy and individuality in Hume’s Treatise.

The importance Hume places on sympathy is underlined by the principle of sympathy appearing in his final conclusion to his Treatise III.III.VI (SBN 1978 p618). In the Treatise, Hume’s purpose is to formulate an account and analysis of human nature (Wright 2009). I would argue that the crux of his account of human nature in the Treatise is what Hume terms sympathy (Lloyd 2000, Baier 1991). I substantiate this claim with the evidence that Hume himself highlights sympathy as “a very powerful principle in human nature” in the opening of his final conclusion in his Treatise III.III.VI (SBN 1978 p618). Moreover, Hume also concludes that “sympathy is the chief source of all moral distinctions” which enables us to know what is moral and what is not (T.III.III.VI; SBN 1978 p618). Sympathy lies at the juncture of many tensions in Hume’s theories and is a source of interpretative challenges (Hirschmann 2000). These concerns are sceptical epistemological tensions that arise from reasoning in seclusion in a Cartesian manner about his account of ethics and his principle of sympathy (Lloyd 2000 & T.I; SBN 1978). These concerns are resolved by Hume when he furthers seventeenth century philosophy of emotion and reason by providing an account of how reason alone will not suffice (T.I; SBN 1978) because it must be combined with sociability and passion via sympathy (T.II, T.III; SBN 1978, Lloyd 2000). Indeed, as Lloyd points out, Hume’s conclusion in Treatise III.III.VI (SBN 1978 p618) answers his concerns at the end of Treatise I making sympathy vital to the structure of the whole treatise (Lloyd 2000).

In Treatise II, (SBN 1978) there are also potential tensions concerning the communication of the passions (Baier 1991). Hume considers “the communication through sympathy with others’ passions” such as pride, love and esteem to be crucial to human nature (Baier 1991 p143). There are two factors involved here, one being the “mind’s preference for self-preoccupation” and self-interest, the other being “interest in other persons and their passions” (Baier 1991 p143). In this way, shared feelings come about because our ideas about the feelings of others are turned into impressions (T.II.III.VI; SBN 1978, T.II.I.XI; SBN 1978). Through these impressions we share the sentiments of others (Treatise; SBN 1978). The idea of others has more “vivacity” when joined with one’s idea of oneself (T.II.II.II; SBN 1978 p339). This is because whatever is relevant to concern for oneself has more immediacy than that which purely relates to another (T.II.II.II; SBN 1978). This introduces the issue Mercer raises of how human beings can be egotistical even whilst at the same time sympathising with another (Hirschmann 2000). I would argue that it would be a self-defeating definition of sympathy or a self-defeating empathic type of definition of sympathy if the notion of sympathy entailed self-orientated concerns as part of the process of feeling with another. In this sense, I find this a self-contradictory description of the sympathetic process because it involves self-concern. Contra Hirschmann (2000), I think it is consistent to claim that one can have a strong sense of self yet sympathise with another person at the same time. Therefore, I think it is possible to find a middle ground in Hume where one neither suffers a “loss of sense of self" (Swanton 2000 p157) nor implicitly goes so far in the other direction that one advocates “separation” (Hirschmann 2000 p178). I think having a strong sense of self and consciousness does not have to entail an egocentric aspect to sympathy (Hirschmann 2000). Hence, I advocate the possibility of retaining one’s own sense of self during both sympathy and what nowadays is often termed empathy. In addition, I would not wish to combine self-concern with sympathy or empathy because the former undermines the latter since self-interest detracts from concern for another.

In contrast, it could be argued that sympathy and interest are so closely linked that it could be inadvisable to draw such a sharp distinction (Hirschmann 2000). Nevertheless, I suggest that egocentric concern for oneself would make sympathy a poor basis for moral theory, moral judgement and for achieving a virtuous character. It would undermine the way in which Hume argues for “social virtues” and constructs a social aspect to sympathy so society functions in accordance with the common good (T.III.III.VI; SBN 1978 p618-20). It would also undermine his view that one needs a person apart from oneself with which to communicate sentiments with and be esteemed by (T.II.II.V; SBN 1978 p363). Indeed, Hirschmann (2000 p187) herself suggests that “collective interests” do alleviate the apparent tension between sympathy and self-interest. However, just because self-concern should not be an important aspect of sympathy, I don’t think sympathy must necessarily entail the loss of sense of self by merging oneself into another. This has been a criticism of sympathy raised in feminist re-evaluations of Hume’s writings (Swanton 2000). Although the lessening of the role of self-concern may increase the altruistic aspect of sympathy, it doesn’t mean that we are expected to suffer from what Nodding refers to as “engrossment” by empathizing with another in a way that means we lose our sense of self (Swanton 2000 p157). Lloyd (2000) presents the interesting example that Hume sympathetically enters into the mind set of other philosophers in his philosophical essay writings. One striking instance is his collection of essays named after ancient philosophical positions eg The Sceptic (Lloyd 2000). In this way, one can see for oneself how Hume himself has undergone the psychological mechanism of sympathy and how it changed his philosophical writing style whilst still retaining his own voice and sense of self (Lloyd 2000). Therefore, sympathy only demands that one is a moral, useful person in society (Swanton 2000). Not to mention that there are “self-protective tendencies” in us that will prevent altruism from leading to a loss of a sense of self (Swanton 2000 p171). So, in this way, sympathy and modern day empathy do not fall into the criticism that it is contradictory to feel with another empathetically and retain a strong sense of self (Hirschmann 2000, Swanton 2000). Thus, I see no reason to concede that either a moral society must have a separate individualistic approach or it will cease to have a sense of self (Hirschmann 2000). Empathy involves the ability to step outside one’s own perspective and see, feel and experience to some extent another’s view on the world making it more possible to gain knowledge of others and knowledge of what is in the collective benefit to all (Hirschmann 2000). Moreover, Hume further attempts to resolve these above tensions in his Treatise III by adding pride of virtue and the more secure framework of love and friendship to his previous arguments (Baier 1991). The greatest tension that Hume addresses in Treatise III is when sympathy involves comparison (Baier 1991).

5

Comparison as a block to sympathy and pro-social empathy.

The principle of comparison highlights the conflict between, on the one hand, partaking in the sentiments of others and, on the other hand, feeling envy when comparing oneself with them and finding that one is of a lesser status than one thinks one should be in relation to them (T.II.II.VIII; SBN 1978 p377). People judge themselves less favourably when comparing themselves to someone of a similar standing (T.II.II.VIII; SBN 1978 p377). As a result, they experience the passion of envy towards these people far more than those of much higher status than themselves because the disparity between them is greater (T.II.II.VIII; SBN 1978 p377). This is because comparison takes place between people and things that are members of the same kind (T.II.II.VIII; SBN 1978 p378). One of Hume’s examples of this is that a jealous soldier feels more “envy” towards someone of a similar rank to himself, such as a sergeant or a corporal rather than a general (T.II.II.VIII; SBN 1978 p377). In this case of envy, I would reject separateness between the self and the other unlike previously in this dissertation when I argued that I see no problems with always retaining a sense of self that’s separate from the other. This is because the soldier example shows how comparison encourages envy and blocks sympathy that, in this case, provides a beneficial link between the self and the other (T.II.II.VIII; SBN 1978 p377). It is this link that Hume’s sympathy is advocating to give social arguments for morality in the Treatise and in his final conclusion to it (T.III.III.VI; SBN 1978).

Suppose one was to emotionally distance oneself from a person by not acknowledging the benefit they bring to the army, as in the example above, or society. One example Hume gives of how this may occur in society is when someone displays a resentful attitude towards another because they “blame” that person for being “too good” because he “exceeds his part in society” (E.VII; SBN 1975 p258, Baier 1991). Then this resentful attitude, I think Hume is saying, introduces an obstacle to sympathy and social bonding in society (E.VII; SBN 1975 p258). Furthermore, Hume is showing here that where sympathy and or benevolence are obstructed and resentment and envy develop, “hatred” thrives which encourages immoral judgement and anti-social behaviour and, in so doing, breaks down the social cohesion of society (Baier 1991 p148, E.VII; SBN 1975 p258). This Hume views as a problem since social cohesion to society is vital in promoting morality (T.III.III.VI; SBN 1978, Baier 1991). In this way, although such comparison may occur within human nature, I read Hume as stating that it should be seen as an obstacle to morality (E.VII; SBN 1975 p258). Hence, I think Hume should have acknowledged this as part of human nature and gone on to address it by providing an account of how it can be avoided in the theory of practical morality he wishes to establish.

However, Baier (1991) finds Hume’s arguments confused about how and when sympathy and comparison function together and when they function separately. She claims they only offer a partial explanation (Baier 1991). Part of the reason for this is whether one agrees with the narrowness of Hume’s concept of self-interest and what constitutes “disinterested” sympathy ie sympathy that does not involve self-interest in any way (Agosta 2011 p3, Baier 1991). Baier (1991) provides counter examples of how Hume’s parallel direction explanation could undermine his overall principle of sympathy and morality. For instance, Baier (1991) asks could Hume’s arguments lead to the counterintuitive claim that one could love one’s rivals and hate one’s partners? In answer to this concern of Baier’s (1991), I don’t see that Hume’s arguments do risk leading to this conclusion. One reason for this is that this would contradict her (Baier 1991) highlighting that Hume would not include business relationships under the passion of love. Therefore, I don’t think business relationships work as a counterexample because they involve self-interest and so, by definition, would be disinterested and not given to passions such as love. If it gives rise to any passions then maybe it would be the passion of pride but the success of a stranger who is one’s rival is unlikely to produce pride as can be seen in Hume’s soldier example (T.II.II.VIII; SBN 1978 p377). Nonetheless, I agree with Baier (1991) that Hume does consider many strands and complexities to sympathy in a way that is vital in order to be able to establish and successfully defend a “sympathy-dependent moral viewpoint” (Baier 1991 p149).

Comparison is also futile because feeling pleasure and displeasure in accordance with inferiority and superiority of status and how much one generally has to be proud of is rarely observed to be linked with happiness (T.II.I.VI; SBN 1978 p294). This is because no matter how much people have to be proud of there is always going to be someone better off than themselves (T.II.I.VI; SBN 1978 p294). Therefore, comparison with others is detrimental to one’s happiness since focusing on what is lacking results in feeling dejected even though there is nothing to be dejected about (T.II.I.VI SBN 1978 p294). Furthermore, this dissatisfaction spreads to other areas of their lives, even ones in which comparison should not apply such as “beauties of nature”, reducing one’s overall capacity for happiness which Hume considers undesirable in his moral theory (Baier 1991 p146, E.IX; SBN 1975 p283-4). My example of this is that I begin to feel dissatisfied with my visit to lake A because, in comparison to lake B, it has less natural beauty.

However, not all passions function in conjunction with comparison in the way pride and envy do (Baier 1991). For instance, love is not prone to comparison unless it is based on self-interest which, I think, intuitively, everyone would agree is not the definition of love (Baier 1991). One admires and loves good qualities in a person without comparing those qualities to one’s own good or not as good qualities (Baier 1991). In this way, one does not draw comparisons between their good qualities and one’s own (Baier 1991). Hume does not address the possibility that people may draw a comparison between a good quality that a person possesses and one’s own qualities and whether one has better or worse qualities than that person. I think that this is an aspect of comparison that Hume should have addressed more directly since he is discussing envy and resentment as an obstacle to sympathy.

Nevertheless, Hume does explore other possible “blocks” to sympathy (Baier 1991 p149), such as, taking “pleasure in the pain of a rival” (T.II.II.IX; SBN 1978 p384). Then, rather than sympathise with any misfortune their rival experiences, they delight in it because the downfall of their competitor is to their benefit (T.II.II.IX; SBN 1978 p384, Baier 1991). However, I suspect this is an oversimplification of the matter. For instance, I would give the counterexample that although it may be to a sports competitor’s A advantage that their opponent B becomes injured and B loses the match and thereby A wins, the sports competitor A may realise that the injury could have just as well happened to them and so, this sort of comparison, would not have to block sympathy. Indeed, it can elicit empathetic pro-social behaviour, such as, alleviating the suffering of their injured opponent B. A parallel example in Hume of pro-social empathetic moral action is his sinking boat example (T.III.III.II; SBN 1978 p594). So, in cases such as these, I would argue that it is empathy rather than sympathy that is at work here since one enters into and shares both the positive and negative sentiments of a victim. This, I suggest, is closer to Tichner’s definition of empathy (Agosta 2011).

6

Avoidance of imperfect sympathy and the criticism of giving rise to disdainful pity.

The principle of comparison can lead to what Humean sympathy can be criticised for, namely as giving rise to a type of pity that makes one person look down on another (Swanton 2000). Swanton (2000) resolves this tension in Hume’s moral philosophy by showing that the principle of comparison does not lead to a pity that involves looking down on the plight of another. This scenario is avoided through “empathic concern” (Swanton 2000 p162). The communication of the sufferer’s pain during empathy leads one to feel with the sufferer. This makes one “unite” with their distress not be “separate” from it (Swanton 2000p162). Hence, via empathy, pity brings about virtue not vice, “tenderness and love” not disdain (Swanton 2000 p162). I agree with Swanton’s (2000) claims about Hume’s text but I would make the distinction between sympathy and empathy even sharper than Swanton (2000). I think when sympathy in Hume is combined with comparison, unlike empathy, it involves pity, defined as a disdainful looking down upon a sufferer. This opens up Hume’s moral theory to criticisms that are unwarranted despite him drawing a distinction between the concept of empathy and a type of sympathy that involves comparison. Hume is not open to this criticism because the former is a part of his moral theory whereas the latter is not. An additional complexity to this is that a person may feel “uneasiness” when encountering the distress of another (Swanton 2000 p158, Dissertation on the Passions, InterLex Past Masters 2000). However, what the critics of Hume, cited by Swanton (2000), seem to overlook is that Hume himself has taken account of sympathy as we now define it and terms it a type of “imperfect sympathy” not sympathy itself (Hume, A Dissertation on the Passions, Section 3 para. 6, InterLex Past Masters 2000 p2, cited as being para. 11/14 p157 in the original). So, when making moral decisions about what constitutes a virtuous character, sympathy is, I think, a part of that decision process alongside considerations about the type of behaviour one would consider in accordance with virtue.

7

Feminist analysis of having a sympathy and empathy based moral account.

Sympathy may involve emotions in others and sentiments but Baier (1991) highlights that sentiments are more than just a synonym for emotion. Baier (1991) argues that Hume is not to be read as an emotivist because he never states any arguments for an emotion-based morality. What Hume was advocating was impressions of reflection and so, in this way, when Hume was analysing the role of emotions in his moral theory, he was including thought alongside it (Baier 1991). Hence, Hume’s use of the term sentiment is meant to be read as including not just emotion but also thought (Baier 1991). Indeed, Baier (1991) goes as far as stating that Hume even included thought into the passions and impressions of reflection. So, when making moral decisions, thought and intellectual judgement are incorporated into his discussions of emotion and sympathy (Baier 1991). Baier (1991) cites Peter Jones as claiming that the term sentiments was used by Hume in a way that spans across many different other meanings to make sentiments include notions of judgement and opinion as well as sometimes being used to mean emotion. Thus, Hume is not arguing for sentiments in a way that implies they involve various emotional reactions but rather he is referring to “necessarily thought-caused” intellectual processes that happen in conjunction with one’s emotions (Baier 1991 p180). Hence, Hume labels them impressions of reflection as opposed to perhaps impressions of sensation (Baier 1991). I think an interesting contrasting alternative approach to Hume’s account of impressions of reflection is de Grouchy’s mixture of sensationalism, which includes pain and responses to the external world via the sensation, in conjunction with emotional response and a Lockean based account of reflection (de Grouchy 1798 Letters on Sympathy xxivxxiv). In this way, she offers an account of sympathy centred on pain (de Grouchy 1798). The advantage of de Grouchy’s approach of involving impressions of sensations rather than reflection is that, by creating an empirically based moral theory without omitting to provide an empirical account of the source of morality, means her account, unlike Hume’s, avoids internal inconsistencies (de Grouchy 1798). Hence, the methods and conclusions of de Grouchy (1798) I think could be used to amend and enhance Hume’s sympathy-based moral theory as well as render it more consistent.

Baier suggests that misinterpretations of Hume’s use and meaning of terms such as sentiments, passion and impressions of reflection could stem from Treatise III where Hume makes clearer cut distinctions between emotion and thoughts of the intellect (Baier 1991). Since this sharp distinction between emotion and thought does not reappear in his subsequent works, Baier concludes that this may be the best way to interpret Hume’s use of the terms reflection of impression, emotion and sentiment (Baier 1991).

Nevertheless, Baier (1991) points out that moral approbation of virtuous or vicious characters must take place after sympathy. Sympathy, in this case, does not mean focusing on the moral character of an individual (Baier 1991). It includes also sympathising with those around that person in order to ascertain the possible positive and negative effects on the people around that individual and how his or her character has, will or might affect social relations in society (Baier 1991). In order for sympathy to not develop into a form of bias, Hume introduces a certain distance between the individual and the person making the moral evaluation of their character (Baier 1991). So, Hume’s sympathy-based moral evaluation retains an element of objectivity through rectifying any biases that can be involved in sympathising with another (Baier 1991). For instance, if person A is related to person B, person A is linked to person B in such a strong, close way that person A has, as Hume terms it, full sympathy with person B (A dissertation on the Passions InterLex Past Masters 2000). This is because person A’s imagination is involving a sense of self (A Dissertation on the Passions InterLex Past Masters 2000). One way is that if one does not know a person particularly well, one sympathises with those who are closer to that individual (Baier 1991). In contrast, with people we are closer to, we should sympathise with people who are less close to that individual (Baier 1991). This is meant to prevent us from valuing that which affects our lives the most (Baier 1991). However, I am not convinced this corrects bias in the case where one is closer to a person and so one is meant to retain perspective by sympathising with those who are not close to that person. Much as this can be of value, I do not think this is a consistent means by which to attain an unbiased perspective and moral outlook. Relying on the judgements of people, who are not close to the individual, means that they themselves may be too distant from that person. This means that one may be sympathising with a person that does not themselves sympathise with either yourself or the person in question. I think reducing bias is better attained when “a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest” because the “sentiment” that arises “denominates it morally good or evil” (T.III.I.II; SBN 1978 p472). Hume also advocates having “steady and general points of view” to reach a “stable judgement of things” (T.III.III.I; SBN 1978 p581-2). These statements of Hume’s, I suggest, helps us judge for ourselves what is morally good for society rather than depending on any individuals’ potentially biased, personal opinions. A complication here is that there is a strong link between sympathy and opinion because Hume states that sympathy influences all one’s opinions (A Dissertation on the Passions InterLex Past Masters 2000). I think, distance is better achieved by attempting to develop one’s faculties in such a way as to be unbiased and unprejudiced when making moral evaluations and decisions while retaining one’s capacity to empathise where needed rather than use the very indirect approach of looking to a small sample of individuals who may or may not be biased themselves for an unbiased moral judgement (T.III.I.II; SBN 1978 p472). One could never conclusively know what such individuals’ own self-interests are when they provide one with their moral views on another individual and so I would consider this an unreliable method for attaining moral knowledge. I think Hume’s discussion about judgement is where the focus should remain. In this way, calm judgements modify our perceptions of moral character in the way that judgement corrects our misperceptions of physical objects in the external world such as when an object appears smaller than another simply because it is in the distance (Baier 1991). Hence, I agree with Hume and Baier’s emphasis on “interpersonal agreement” in reaching moral evaluations rather than merely “detachment” (Baier 1991 p182).

8

Conclusion.

In this dissertation, I have responded to a perceived gap in moral theory research in arguing for stronger, “more precise” distinction being made between sympathy and empathy than is presently the case (Agosta 2011 p1). I have redefined empathy by retaining Tichner’s definition of feeling with and into the emotions of another while rejecting it being a “neutral form of data gathering” (Agosta 2011 p1). Hume’s use of sympathy, I think, clearly fits Tichner’s definition of empathy when he depicts how “we enter so deep into the opinion and affections of others” (T. II.I. XI; SBN 1978 p319, Selby-Bigge, SBN 1975 intro to Enquiry on pxxi). This sociability, I think, is vital to Hume’s and feminists’ discussion of sympathy as a feeling with because this avoids the criticism of being similar to pity in a way that inhibits moral, pro-social behaviour, also making their discussion about empathy not sympathy. Hume’s accounts of sympathy is criticised for suggesting a high degree of individualistic behaviour (Hirschmann 2000). However, I think his sympathy account remains plausible by incorporating pro-social moral behaviour that binds individuals together into a moral society in which they empathetically listen to and have knowledge of others rather than stay within their own self-interested assumptions (Hirschmann 2000). Against the charge of individualism, Baier (1991) emphasises his social notions over aspects of his individualistic psychological concepts (Hirschmann 2000) and Hume also corrects any individualistic over-statements by advocating the general uniformity of human nature (T.I.III.VIII;SBN 1978 P105, T.I.III.XII;SBN 1978 P132-3) as does de Grouchy (1798).

Nevertheless, Hume’s account has a problem of circularity causing tension between individualism and socially-based arguments (Hirschmann 2000). Hirschmann (2000) suggests a feminist resolution to this by providing an account of social interaction, participation and knowledge within society (Hirschmann 2000). This is reinforced by Baier who claims our sentiments, imagination, beliefs and lives all contribute to knowledge (Hirschmann 2000). So, I advocate a feminist moral account of empathy drawing inspiration from Hume. It has the inbuilt advantage of people morally judging for themselves within a social structure rather than in isolation which promotes an empathetic co-feeling with other individuals (Hirschmann 2000). Further evidence Hume may have been arguing for pro-social empathy is, I suggest, in his discussion of comparison between things of a similar kind (T.II.II.VIII; SBN 1978 p378) as illustrated in Hume’s soldier example when envy arises more between soldiers of a similar rank (T.II.II.VIII; SBN 1978 p377). Although comparison is an aspect of human nature, it must not become a sympathy blocker by leading to “envy and hatred” (T.III.III.II; SBN 1978 p595, Baier 1991).

I suggest Baier’s (1991) description of the type of comparisons one makes between oneself and others informs my claim that Hume is describing empathy not sympathy. Comparisons that don’t engage the imagination and emotions become a sympathy blocker because the mechanism of sympathy does not go past the idea of another’s passion and so never gets converted into an impression that enables one to feel with the person (Baier 1991). So, I find what Baier (1991) says about comparison applicable to the distinction between sympathy and empathy and favours reading Hume as referring to empathy not sympathy because sympathy, unlike empathy, involves comparison which is a sympathy blocker. I would further suggest that Hume might favour empathy as opposed to sympathy because Hume favours sympathy that requires “effort” and is an immediate reaction to another person’s emotions (T.II.II.IX; SBN 1978 p386, Baier 1991 p149).

So, comparison, alongside sociability, informs my redefinition of empathy as involving pro-social behaviour that leads to moral action, while highlighting that Hume may have used the concept of empathy when discussing sympathy. Since sympathy is pivotal to his moral account, this would then be in line with my interpretation that Hume is offering an empathy-based moral theory. This also makes his moral theory relevant to feminist ethics. I have also suggested that Hume’s moral account can be refined along the lines of de Grouchy’s (1798) approach of replacing impression of reflection with impression of sensation eg pain to give a more consistent empiricist, experienced based, account of morality. Hence, de Grouchy’s (1798) refinement not only has the advantage of furthering feminist ethics but also of enhancing Hume’s moral account regardless of feminist moral theory.

References:

Agosta, L., (2011) Empathy and Sympathy in Ethics, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://iep.utm.edu/emp-symp/

Baier, A.C. (1991) A Progress of Sentiments – Reflections on Hume’s Treatise, Harvard University Press

de Grouchy, S., (1798) Letters on Sympathy –

http://www.jstor.org/stable/27757411

Hirschmann N.J., Sympathy, Empathy and Obligation: A feminist re-rereading chapter 8 in Jacobson, A. J., (ed) (2000) Feminist Interpretations of Hume, Pennsylvania State University Press Re-reading the Canon series

Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, (ed) Selby-Bigge, Nidditch, (1978) Oxford Clarendon Press, 2nd edition

Hume, D., Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals (ed) Selby-Bigge, Nidditch, (1975) Oxford Clarendon Press, 3rd edition

Hume, D., Of Parties in General, Essay 8 in Part 1 of Essays Moral, Political and Literary, InterLex Past Masters (2000) British Philosophy: 1600-1900 Copyright 1989-2012 InteLex All Rights Reserved www.nlx.com

Hume, D., The Sceptic, Essay 18 in Part 1 of Essays Moral, Political and Literary, InterLex Past Masters (2000) British Philosophy: 1600-1900 Copyright 1989-2012 InteLex All Rights Reserved www.nlx.com

Lloyd, G., Hume on the Passions chapter 2 in Jacobson A. J.,(ed) (2000) Feminist Interpretations of Hume, Pennsylvania State University Press Re-reading the Canon series

Selby-Bigge, L.A. Introduction in Hume, D., Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals (ed) Selby-Bigge, Nidditch, (1975) Oxford Clarendon Press, 3rd edition

Swanton, C, Compassion as a Virtue in Hume chapter 7 in Jacobson A. J., (ed) (2000) Feminist Interpretations of Hume, Pennsylvania State University Press Re-reading the Canon series

Wright, J.P., (2009) Hume’s ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’ An Introduction, Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts, Cambridge University Press

Around the Table with Hume and Friends

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